University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

11-12-1963

Teall v. City of Cudahy
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Teall v. City of Cudahy 60 Cal.2d 431 (1963).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/817

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

Nov. 1%3]

TEALL
[GO

C.~,l

.t:J1;

v.
~·1

[L. A. No. 27-.185.

CITY OF CUDAHY

431

Cal.Rl'tr. 8G9. 386 P.Zd 4931

In Bank.

Nov. 12, 1963.]

DEBRA ANN TEALL, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. 'fHE CITY OF CUDAHY, Defendant and Respondent.
[la,lb] Streets-Injuries Caused by Defects-Actions-Pleadings.-In an action against a municipality for injurics sustained by a 7 -yrar-old child who was struck by a truck while
crossing a street, a complaint alleging that due to the arr:lUgement of the traffic signals at thc intersection the only
signal vi~ible to the child indicated to her that vehicular traffic in the street she wished to cross would yield the right of
way, whereas all signals were in fact red during each cycle
to permit vehicles that had entl'red the intersection on It
green light to clear it before pedestrians brgan to cross, was
sufficient to state a cause of action against the municipality
under former Gov. Code, § 53051 (now § 835), imposing liability for injuries to persons and property resulting from
the dangerous or defective condition of public property.
[2] Municipal Corporations-Torts-Liability for Dangerous or
Defective Condition of Property.-Public property is in a
dangerous or defective condition within the meaning of former Gov. Code, § 53051 (now § 835), when it involves an unreasonable risk of injury to the public.
[3] Streets-Injuries Caused by Defects-Traffic Signals.Where It municipality llndertakes to control traffic at an intersection by installing traffic signals, it invites reliance on
the signals and it may be held liable if it creates a dangerous
or defective condition in making such installation.
[4] Municipal Corporations-Torts-Liability for Dangerous or
Defective Condition of Property.-Former Gov. Code, § 53051
(now § 83;"», imposing liability for injuries to persons and
property resulting from the dangerous or defective condition
of public property, did not eXCl'pt dangerous or defectivo
conditions resulting from the exercise of governmental discretion. (Disapproying lJIercado v. City of Pasadena, 176 Cal.
App.2d 28, 32-33 [1 Cal.Rptr. 134] to the extent that it indicates otherwise.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Leon T. David, Judge. Reversed.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d., Highways and Streets, § 234; Am.Jur.,
Highways (1st ed § 5G4).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Streets § 85; [2] M:uncipal Corporations, § 438(5); [3] Streets, § 70; [4] Municipal Corporations, § 438(1).
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Action for prrsollal injurirs sustailled by a child when she
was struek by a truck while cl'ossillg a street within a marked
crosswalk after starting from a point where the visibility of
thc guiding traffic signal was allt·gculy obscured. Judgment
of dismissal after demurrer to second amended complaint was
sustail1l'U, reverseu.
Abraham Marcus and Stanley O. Epstein for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Betts & Loomis, Albert H. Ebright and Brrllard A. Leckie
for Defenuant and Respondent.

-)

TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered aftt'r the sustaining of drfl'ndant's general
demurrer to her second amended complaint, which alleged
that defl'ndant was liable for personal injuries under section
53051 of the Governmcnt Code. 1
Section 53051 was repealed effective September 20, 1963
(Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, § 18). At the same time extensive new
legislation became effective governing claims and actions
against public entities and public employers. (Gov. Code,
810-895.8; Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, § 1.) This legislation provides tl1at it "applies retroactively to the full extent that it
constitutionally can be so applied." (Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, §
45, subd. (a).) Examination of thc statutory changes, however does not disclose any material changes in the law applicable to the facts alleged.!!
1" A local agency is liable for injuries to persons and property resulting from thc dangerous or defecth·e comlition of public property if the
legislative body, board, or person authorized to remcdy the condition:
"(a) Had knowledge or notice of the defective or dangerolls condition.
"(b) For a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge or receiving
notice, failed to remedy the condition or to take action reasonably
necessary to protect the public against the condition."
:!G o'·crnment Code, section 83,> provides: "Exccpt as provided by
statute. a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous
condition of its property if the plaintiff estahli~hes that the property
was in a dangerous con,iition at the time of thc injury, that the injury
was proximately caused by the daugerous conuition, that the dangerous
('ondition createtl a reasonably foreseeable ri~k of the kind of injury
whieh was incurred, and that cith('r:
"(a) A ncgligent or wrongful aet or omission of an employee of the
(lllhJj,· l'nti'ty within the sropc of his employment created the dangerous
condition; or
"\I.J) The puhlic entity had actual or cOll.trllctive lIotice of the
dangerous condition under 8ection 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the
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The amended complaint alleges that plaintiff, a 7-yearold ~hild, was severely injured ".. hile crossing a street in
the City of Cudahy. We have drawn a diagram an as aid to
an understanding of the facts alleged.
N
Traffic lights controlled the movemcnt
of pedestrians and vehicles at the intersection. The light at C was designed to
guide pedestrians crossing in the cross-.~~
walk from A to B. Pedestrians standI
ing at A, however, could not see this
light, but could see a light located on the
east side of the street designed to conA.
trol vehicular traffic from the north.
The exact location of this signal is not Cecilia
alleged. It appears, however, from a
Truck
map attached to plaintiff's brief, the
C.
D.
accuracy of which is not challenged, that
.sa
the signal was located atD. Because the
Cecilia
distance between the north and south
~
entrances of Cecilia Street was approximately one hundred yards, all signals
were red during each cycle to permit
vehicles that had entered the intersection on a green light to
clear it before pedestrians began to cross.
Immediately before the accident, the signal at D was red to
the north. Unable to see any other signal, plaintiff assumed
that the light at C was green and proceeded from A into the
street, where she was struck by a truck coming from the
.
south that had not cleared the intersection.
[1a] The only issue before us is whether the court erred
in ruling as a matter of law that the alleged arrangement of
the lights at the intersection did not constitute a dangerolls
or defective condition of public property. The other elements
of liability under section 53051 were properly alleged.
[2] Public property is in a dangerous or defective condition when it "involves an unreasonable risk of injury to the

t

~1II1111111
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<II

injury to bave tllken measures to protect against tbe dangerous condition."
Governmellt Corle, section 830, suhdh'ision (a), provides; I I • Dangerous condition' means 8 condition of property that creates a substantial
(as distinguished from II minor, trh-ial or insignificant) risk of injury
wben such property or a'l.iI1~('nt property is used with due care in a
manner in which it is reasonaUly foreseeable that it will be used."
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public." (Hau,J, v. City uf XCUlport Brach, 46 Ca1.2d 213,
217 [::!03 P.~d 481.) [lb] l't.'d,'stl'i'lllS have a right to rely
on traffic signals. The ollly s:gual visible to plaintiff indicated
to her that north and south n,l;ienlar traffic would yit'ld the
right of way. Such a condition involves an unreasonable risk
of injury to the puhlie. It is not lIlaterially different from one
in which, because of a mechanical defect, all lights at a~\
interscction are green simultaneously. (See Bady V. Det :!'ill 1',
127 Ca1.App.2d 321, 338-339 [273 P.2d 941].) The allegations
of the complaint are therefore sufficient to state a cause of
action.
Defendant contends that only an additional signal would
have remedied the condition complained of and that under
Perry V. City of Santa Monica, 130 Cal.App.2d 370, 372-375
[270 P.2d 92], it had no duty to install one. (See also Gov.
Code, §§ 830.4, 830.8.) [3] In the present case, howcY<'r,
defendant undertook to control traffic at the intersection and
invited reliance on the signals. It may be held liable if it
rreated a dangero\1s or defective condition ill doing' so.
(Dudulit V. City of San J!atco, 167 Cal.App.2d 593, 5%-507
[334 P.2d 9GB] ; Irvin V. Padclford, 127 Cal.App.2d 135, 142143 [273 P.2d 5aO] ; see 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1058) § 23.14, p. 494.)
[4] Im'okiug' Mercado V. City of Pasadena, 176 Cal.App.
2d 28, 32-33 [1 Cal.Rptr. 134], defendant contends that
liabilit~- undt'r section 53051 cannot be predicated on the locatinn of traffic signals because their location involves the C'XP1'rise of legislative discrction. Section 53051, however, did not
('xcept <1ang-crons or defective conditions rC'sulting from the
cxC'rcise of governmental discretion, and to the extent that it
inc1icatC's otherwise, the Mcrcado case is disapproved. T J111S,
in George v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Ca1.2d 303 [79 P.2d
7~:3], it was contended that if the city were liablc for "tIle
result of a plan of construction" the jury would have "the
right to pass upon the discretion of the municipal authol'itif's
to adopt a system or general plan of improvement of its
streets." "\Y C' pointed out that under section 58051 "th~
municipality is liable for injuries resulting from the dangerous or defectiye condition of its public street, whetlle1' S\1t'h
condition arises from the construction of said street in the
first instance, or is due to a defcct crcated then'in aftl'r i(..;
construction." (11 Ca1.2d at pp. 307, 308-309.)
It is true that the rule of tIle Gcorge easc has been modifi,~d
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by section 830.6 of the GOYernment Code,3 which provides
new standards and proced nres for determiuillg w!leth!'r a
properly approved plan or design has resulted in a dangerous
condition. It docs 110t appear from the facts alleged in the
complaint, however, whether or not the new defense provided
by section 830.6 is available to defendant. Until defendant
raises that defense by appropriate pleadings, it would be
premature to COIlS ide l' whethl'r it may constitntioually apply
to a cause of action that accrued before section 830.6 was
enacted. (Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, IIIC., 32 Cal.2d 53,
65 [195 P.2d 1] ; Estate of Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 534 [73 P.
424, 96 Am.St.Rep. 161] ; MacLeod v. City of Los Altos, 182
Cal.App.2d 364, 366 [6 Cal.Rptr. 326].)
ThE' judgment is reversed.
Gibson, 0. J., Schauer, J., MeComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., coneurred.
RE'spondellt's petition for a rehearing was denied December
11, 1963.

I"Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable under this
chapter for an injury caused by the plan or design of a construction of,
or an improvement to, public property where such plan or design has
been approved in advance of the construction or improYemcnt hy the
legislative body of the public entity or by some other body or employee
exercising discretionary authority to give such apprm'al or where snch
plan or design is prepared in conformity with standards previously 80
approved, if the trial or appellate court determines that there is any
substantial evidence upon the basis of which (a) a reasonable puulic
employee could have adopted the plan or design or the stan<lrlTlls then',
for or (b) a reasonable legislative body or other body or elllployet>
could have approved the plan or design or the standards therefor. ,.
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